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FRANKFURTER’S CHAMPION:  
JUSTICE POWELL, MONELL, AND THE MEANING 
OF “COLOR OF LAW” 
David Jacks Achtenberg*
INTRODUCTION 
 
The unpublished papers of United States Supreme Court Justices provide 
intriguing insights into the internal decision-making processes of the Court.  
Yet those papers are not easily accessible even to those who have the time 
and resources to travel to the various locations where the originals are 
stored.  For the past several years, as a small step toward alleviating this 
problem, I have been compiling and posting on the internet a digital archive 
of the available unpublished papers of Supreme Court Justices dealing with 
various § 1983 civil rights cases.1
 
*  Professor and Law Foundation Scholar, University of Missouri–Kansas City School of 
Law.  J.D., 1973, University of Chicago School of Law; B.A., 1970, Harvard University.  I 
received invaluable research assistance on this article (and on the Petition to Decision 
website) from Michael Barzee, Lauren Rogler, Sarah Liesen, George Ngengwe, and 
Stephanie Outlaw.  The unfailing courtesy and outstanding assistance of John Jacobs at the 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives and of the Manuscript Reference Librarians at the Library of 
Congress, particularly Bruce Kirby, are gratefully acknowledged.  The material on which 
this Article is based could not have been compiled without their help.  Research for this 
Article was supported by generous grants from the UMKC Law Foundation.  
  This Article describes a tentative 
 1. This Article relies heavily on documents from that archive that are available at the 
website www.PetitionToDecision.com.  To simplify citation and retrieval of these 
documents, the following citation conventions will be used: 
 
“Blackmun Papers” refers to documents on file with the Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Blackmun Papers.  All such papers 
can be accessed at http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/
BlackmunAsFound02.htm, (the Blackmun Archive Page of the Monell section 
of the Petition to Decision website). 
 
“Brennan Papers” refers to documents on file with the Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, William J. Brennan Papers.  All such papers can be 
accessed at http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/Brennan
AsFound06.htm, (the Brennan Archive Page of the Monell section of the 
Petition to Decision website). 
 
“Marshall Papers” refers to documents on file with the Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Thurgood Marshall Papers.  All such papers can be 
accessed at http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/Marshall
AsFound01.htm, (the Marshall Archive Page of the Monell section of the 
Petition to Decision website). 
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hypothesis based on the Justices’ papers relating to Monell v. Department of 
Social Services,2
This Article suggests such an explanation:  that Monell’s idiosyncratic 
restriction on municipal liability was the result of Justice Powell’s beliefs 
about what might appear to be an unrelated issue—the proper meaning of 
the phrase “under color of law.”  Justice Powell had become convinced, like 
Justice Frankfurter before him, that “under color of law” should be 
interpreted narrowly to restrict all § 1983 suits to situations in which the 
wrongdoer’s conduct was actually authorized by state or local law.  
However, knowing that he would be unable to muster a majority to apply 
that restriction across the board, Powell settled for an opinion applying it to 
suits against municipalities.  He was able to accomplish this goal because 
he was the crucial fifth vote that Justice Brennan needed to make it possible 
for cities to be sued at all.  I call this explanation the “Frankfurter’s 
Champion” hypothesis, because Justice Powell was seeking to resurrect the 
position Justice Frankfurter had taken in Monroe v. Pape.
  the case that decided that cities could be sued under 
§ 1983.  That hypothesis deals with a puzzling aspect of the case:  its 
conclusion that, while cities and other governmental entities are subject to 
§ 1983 suits, they cannot be sued on a respondeat superior basis.  This 
conclusion is puzzling because the opinion’s arguments in favor of it are so 
unpersuasive as to raise the question of whether the real explanation lies 
somewhere else. 
3
The Article will also discuss whether Justice Powell’s position and the 
ultimate no-respondeat-superior ruling in Monell can instead be explained 
by the briefs of the parties or by arguments developed in chambers by the 
 
 
“Powell Papers,” “Powell Papers – Burrell,” and “Powell Papers – Civil 
Rights” all refer to documents on file with Washington & Lee University, the 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers.  “Powell Papers” 
can be accessed at http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/
PowellAsFound01.htm, (the Powell Archive Page of the Monell section of the 
Petition to Decision website).  “Powell Papers – Burrell” can be accessed at 
http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/BurrellDocs/PowellDocs/PowellBurre
llFilesPage.htm.  “Powell Papers – Civil Rights” can be accessed at 
http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/NCSFDocs/PowellDocs/PowellNCSF
Page.htm. 
 
“Blackmun Papers,” “Brennan Papers,” “Marshall Papers,” and “Powell 
Papers” are all documents from the Justices’ files on Monell or from the 
Justices’ general files for the 1977–78 term.  “Powell Papers – Burrell” are 
from Justice Powell’s files on Burrell v. McCray.  “Powell Papers – Civil 
Rights” are from various non-case-specific files Justice Powell maintained on 
civil rights matters, e.g., a notebook in which he compiled various memos and 
documents relating to the Civil Rights Acts. 
 
Many of the documents cited in this Article are typed documents that have been annotated in 
hand by someone other than the document’s author, e.g., a memo written by Justice Brennan 
with handwritten notes by Justice Powell.  This Article will use underlining (as opposed to 
italics) to indicate hand underlining by someone other than the document’s author.  Typed 
underlining will be shown as italics unless otherwise indicated in the footnote. 
 2. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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clerks or Justices.  After concluding that the briefs do not provide any such 
explanation, the Article will discuss a plausible alternative hypothesis:  that 
Justice Powell may have become convinced that the legislative history of  
§ 1983 restricted the ambit of the act to “actual wrongdoers,” i.e., to 
defendants who were “at fault.”  The Article concludes that, although 
plausible, this explanation is less persuasive than the Frankfurter’s 
Champion hypothesis, since Powell abandoned the fault-based argument 
when it threatened his efforts to broker an opinion that limited municipal 
liability in a way consistent with Frankfurter’s narrow view of “under color 
of law.” 
I recognize that “[f]ew speculations are more treacherous than diagnosis 
of the motives or genetic explanations of the position taken by Justices in 
Supreme Court decisions.”4
I.  FROM MONROE TO MONELL:  THE TRADITIONAL EXPLANATION 
  The explanation presented in this Article is a 
tentative hypothesis—one that may be strengthened or weakened as further 
evidence is gathered from the recently released Potter Stewart Papers and 
from the forthcoming Byron White Papers—but one that, on the current 
evidence, seems more likely than the alternative explanations. 
Any effort to explain Monell must begin with Justice Douglas’s opinion 
in Monroe v. Pape.5  Monroe had two important holdings.6  First, the Court 
held that state or local employees act “under color of” state law even if their 
actions are not authorized by—or even are forbidden by—state or local 
law.7  In other words, “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law 
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority 
of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”8  This color of law 
holding evoked a lengthy and passionate dissent from Justice Frankfurter 
who argued that § 1983 was never intended to cover conduct committed 
under the mere “pretense of [state or local] authority.”9
Monroe’s second holding was less favorable to plaintiffs.  The Court held 
that cities could never be sued under § 1983 because they were not suable 
“persons” within the meaning of the statute.
 
10  The Court arrived at this 
result based on its interpretation of the statute’s legislative history, 
particularly its conclusion that the 42nd Congress’s rejection of a proposal 
known as the Sherman Amendment showed that it opposed all forms of 
municipal liability.11
 
 4. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 317 (1955). 
  This municipal non-liability holding was, at the time, 
 5. 365 U.S. 167. 
 6. Monroe’s third holding—that § 1983 protected all constitutional rights rather than 
just those that were inherent in a citizen’s relationship to the federal government, id. at 170–
71—is not pertinent to the discussion of Monell. 
 7. Id. at 171–87. 
 8. Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 
 9. Id. at 238–39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 187–92 (majority opinion). 
 11. Id. at 188–91.  In simple terms, the Sherman Amendment made cities (or, in an 
earlier version, city inhabitants) liable for damages caused by the depredations of the Ku 
Klux Klan or by similar mob violence.  For a more detailed discussion of the three versions 
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far less controversial than the Court’s color of law holding, and it elicited 
no dissents. 
However, by the mid-1970s, Monroe’s municipal non-liability holding 
was under considerable stress.  Scholarly commentary was highly critical.12  
More significantly, Monroe and other cases holding that cities and counties 
could not be sued13 seemed irreconcilable with a large number of cases—
including well-known desegregation cases—that permitted § 1983 suits 
against school districts.14  Meanwhile, the civil rights plaintiffs’ bar began 
developing creative arguments to effectively circumvent municipal non-
liability without explicitly overruling Monroe.15
Monell v. Department of Social Services
 
16 resolved this tension by 
overruling Monroe’s categorical municipal non-liability holding while at 
the same time creating what can be called the Monell doctrine—a doctrine 
under which cities cannot be sued on a respondeat superior basis but instead 
are subject to suit only for acts which implemented or executed official city 
policy.17  The Court’s opinion justified the rejection of respondeat superior 
liability by reinterpreting the meaning of Congress’s defeat of the Sherman 
Amendment,18
 
of the Sherman Amendment and for their full text, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 
U.S. 658, 666–69, 702–04 (1978). 
 i.e., by concluding that, since Congress refused to impose 
 12. See, e.g.,  Don B. Kates, Jr. & J. Anthony Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under 
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1972); Developments in the 
Law:  Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1190–95 (1977). 
 13. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 
U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). 
 14. See cases cited in Monell, 436 U.S. at 663 n.5.  This conflict was exacerbated when 
the Court, in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, held that Monroe’s municipal non-liability rule 
forbade equitable relief just as it forbade monetary damages. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). 
 15. For a detailed discussion of the theories that were being bruited about, see Michael 
H. Gottesman & Dennis D. Clark, Federal Jurisdiction over Teachers’ Fourteenth 
Amendment Claims in Light of City of Kenosha v. Bruno 6–50 (undated [marked received 
Dec. 4, 1973]) (copy on file with the author).  This unpublished memo was circulated widely 
among civil rights attorneys and laid out various alternatives including suits against school 
district officials in their official capacity, id. at 14–29, and suits brought directly against 
school districts asserting an implied cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment 
similar to the cause of action recognized in Bivens, id. at 29–50.  The former theory was used 
by the Monell plaintiffs. See infra text accompanying notes 97–103.  Fear of adoption of the 
latter theory was one motive for Powell’s desire to overturn the blanket municipal non-
liability rule. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 712–13 (Powell, J., concurring); Memorandum from 
Nancy Bregstein to Justice Powell:  Inferring a Damage Action from the Fourteenth 
Amendment  (Aug. 25, 1977), in Powell Papers – Civil Rights, supra note 1, at Box 132:  
File [3] (extensive memo discussing the theory); Memorandum from Justice Powell to 
Conference 9 (Feb. 23, 1978), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 5 (warning 
that lawyers had “gotten the word” and were beginning to assert the theory); Memorandum 
from Justice Powell to Eugene Comey (June 28, 1977), in Powell Papers – Civil Rights, 
supra note 1, at Box 130B:  File [1] (describing conference at which professors discussed the 
theory and assigning it to his clerks as a summer memo project).  
 16. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 17. Id. at 690–91. 
 18. Id. at 693–94; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478–79 & n.7 
(1986) (stating that Monell was based primarily on legislative history, particularly inferences 
from the rejection of the Sherman Amendment).  To a lesser extent, the Court relied on a 
dubious textual argument. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. 
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one form of vicarious liability (the Sherman Amendment), it opposed all 
forms of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior.  The majority 
opinion gave no hint that disagreement over the meaning of “color of” law 
played any part in the decision.19
There are serious problems with this view of the genesis of the Monell 
doctrine.  As many scholars have argued, Congress’s rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment—a radical proposal to make cities liable for the 
depredations of private mobs—simply does not imply that Congress was 
hostile to traditional respondeat superior liability for the wrongs of a city’s 
own employees.
 
20  Despite Justice Brennan’s half-hearted footnote 
statement to the contrary,21
More significant than the scholarly consensus is the evidence that the 
Justices knew that the legislative history argument for the Monell doctrine 
made no sense.  The respondent’s brief actually conceded that the rejected 
Sherman Amendment would have imposed a form of strict liability that was 
quite different from traditional respondeat superior: 
 opposition to a non-traditional, extreme form of 
vicarious liability does not imply opposition to a traditional, moderate form 
of vicarious liability.  After all, the fact that a corporation is not ordinarily 
liable if a gang member assaults someone on its property does not imply 
that the corporation will not be liable if one of its own employees does so. 
 We appreciate, as this Court has, the distinction between the type of 
strict liability which would have been imposed on municipalities by the 
amendment proposed by Senator Sherman, as well as its later proposed 
version and the situation where a municipality would be held liable on the 
basis of traditional principles of respondeat superior.22
 
 19. The only hint that “color of law” concerns might have played a role in the Monell 
decision is the statement in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion that “[n]o conduct of 
government comes more clearly within the ‘under color of’ state law language of § 1983” 
than actions that are “fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under, state law.” 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 
 20. See, e.g., David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously:  Municipal Liability 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2183, 2196–2217 (2005); Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional 
Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 631–35, 643 (1999); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Reflections on 
Monell’s Analysis of the Legislative History of § 1983, 31 URB. LAW. 407, 430–34 (1999); 
Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983:  A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 259–261 (1987); Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Municipal Liability:  The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517, 
537 (1987); Charles A. Rothfeld, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of 
Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 943–46 (1979); Peter H. Schuck, Municipal 
Liability Under Section 1983:  Some Lessons from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 
GEO. L.J. 1753, 1755 n.13 (1989); see also Board of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 
397, 431–33 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834 
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Posner, J.) (stating that scholars agree that the rejection of respondeat superior was based on 
“historical misreadings”). 
 21. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692–93 n.57. 
 22. Brief for Respondent at 9–10, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
(No. 75-1914), 1977 WL 187959, at *9–10 (citations omitted).  The influential amicus brief 
of the NEA and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights also distinguished the two types of 
liability. Brief for National Education Association and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
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Similarly, while the Court was considering Monell, Justice Powell 
received and reviewed a memo from his clerk, Nancy Bregstein, that clearly 
explained that Congress’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment did not 
imply that municipalities should not be liable for the acts of municipal 
agents.23  Quoting one of the leading articles critical of Monroe, Bregstein 
wrote, “Nothing in the rejection of the Sherman Amendment is inconsistent 
with the idea that municipalities should be liable for the torts of their own 
employees.”24  Powell underlined a similar passage later in the memo:  
“[T]he kind of liability contemplated by the Sherman amendment would 
have been quite different from imposing liability on municipalities for their 
own wrongful acts or those of their agents.  Congress did not come close to 
expressing any opinion on the constitutionality of imposing the latter 
liability.”25  The full meaning of the debates may have been ambiguous, 
Bregstein wrote, but nothing in them suggested rejection of respondeat 
superior:  “It is plain that whatever the meaning of the debates on the 
Sherman amendment, Congress has not spoken on the question of the 
‘necessity’ or ‘appropriateness’ of a damage remedy against municipalities 
for [their] own or [their] agents’ violation of constitutional rights.”26  
Powell praised the Bregstein memo, recommended that one of his other 
clerks read it, and gave no indication that he disagreed with the passages 
quoted above.27
Even Justice Rehnquist, who favored blanket municipal non-liability, 
recognized that there was nothing in the defeat of the Sherman Amendment 
that justified rejection of municipal respondeat superior.
 
28  During the 
Court’s November 4, 1977 post-argument conference, Justice Rehnquist 
insisted that, since municipal corporations could only act through their 
agents, it was impossible to “draw [the] line between policy making 
officials and subordinate officers.”29
 
Under Law, as Amicus Curiae at 25–26 & App. 25a–26a, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978) (No. 75-1914), 1977 WL 187961, at *24–26 & App. 25a–26a 
[hereinafter NEA Brief]. 
  In a subsequent detailed memo to the 
other Justices, he elaborated on this point: 
 23. Bregstein, supra note 15, at 1 (handwritten annotation by Justice Powell indicating 
that he reviewed the memo on September 10–12, 1977 and describing it as a “splendid 
memo”). 
 24. Id. at 35 (quoting Kates & Kouba, supra note 12, at 136). 
 25. Id. at 37. 
 26. Id. at 42–43; see also id. at 42 (“The Court [in Monroe] was not presented with the 
argument that the debates were not relevant to municipal liability for unconstitutional 
conduct of its own agents.”). 
 27. Id. at 1 (handwritten annotation by Justice Powell describing it as a “splendid 
memo”); Memorandum from Samuel Estreicher to Justice Powell:  Procunier v. Navarette 
25 (Aug. 30, 1977), in Powell Papers – Civil Rights, supra note 1, at Box 132:  File [2] 
(handwritten annotation by Justice Powell suggesting that, in connection with Estreicher’s 
analysis of the legislative history of § 1983, he should “[s]ee Nancy’s fine memo”). 
 28. Ironically, the arguments Justice Rehnquist made within chambers on Monell are 
quite similar to the arguments Justice Stevens made—and Justice Rehnquist rejected—in 
Tuttle. Compare infra text accompanying notes 29–30, with Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 
U.S. 808, 834 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 29. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes 2 (Nov. 4, 1977), in Brennan Papers, supra note 
1, at Box 430:  File 8; see also Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes 2 (Nov. 4, 1977), in 
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[The legislative history of § 1983] affords no basis for saying that, 
although cities are “persons” within the Act, they are not liable on a 
respondeat superior basis for actions of their numerous employees.  The 
Sherman Amendment was not an effort to impose vicarious liability on 
cities and counties for acts of their employees; it was a far more drastic 
measure, intended to impose liability . . . for mere failure to prevent 
private vandals from committing crimes against persons or property 
within the municipal jurisdiction.  Just as Congress could quite 
consistently have rejected it and still intended that municipal corporations 
be “persons” within § 1983, Congress could have rejected the amendment 
and still intended that “persons” . . . are [to be held] liable for affirmative 
acts of their employees under a respondeat superior theory.  In short, I 
think that once municipal corporations are included within the definition 
of “person” in § 1983, it is doctrinally very difficult to say that they are 
not liable on a respondeat superior [basis] because Congress rejected the 
Sherman Amendment.30
The weakness of the Court’s legislative history argument suggests to 
some that the result was simply an ad hoc political compromise—perhaps 
one motivated by concern about the perilous financial condition of some 
cities
 
31—in which votes for an expansion of municipal civil rights liability 
were obtained in exchange for a rule that insured that cities would not have 
to pay damages every time a rogue police officer mistreated a suspect.32
But more than three decades later, with access to the unpublished papers 
of Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Powell, a more complete 
story of the case emerges.  Those papers suggest that there may have been 
an odd logic behind Monell:  one driven by the desire of a particular justice 
to use Monell to push the Court as far as practically possible toward an 
interpretation of § 1983 that reflected what he believed to be its proper 
meaning. 
  
One could understand how the court could reach that outcome as a result of 
politics or even statesmanship but not as a principled effort at statutory 
construction. 
 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 1, at Box 258:  File 2 (paraphrasing Rehnquist as saying, “A 
municipal corporation acts only through individuals.  Cannot draw the line.”). 
 30. Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference 9 (Mar. 6, 1978) in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1 at Box 189:  File 6.  Even Justice Brennan grudgingly acknowledged 
that defeat of the Sherman Amendment was not logically inconsistent with respondeat 
superior liablity. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 692–93 n.57 (1978). 
 31. In the mid-to-late 1970s, New York City went through a period of widely publicized 
financial crisis, and the oral arguments show that the court was well aware of that situation. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 27, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
(No. 75-1914), available at http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/
z Other Source pdfs  Monell/Monell Oral Argument Transcript (v2).pdf.  For a quick 
overview of the crisis, see, for example, Roger Dunstan, Overview of New York City’s Fiscal 
Crisis, CRB NOTE (Cal. Research Bureau, Cal. State Library), Mar. 1, 1995, available at 
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/95/notes/V3N1.pdf. 
 32. Schuck, supra note 20, at 1755 n.13. 
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II.  FROM MONROE TO MONELL:  FRANKFURTER’S CHAMPION 
Imagine a Justice with the following three characteristics:  First, he 
believed that Monroe’s municipal non-liability holding was wrong and that 
Congress never intended to exempt cities from § 1983 suits.  Second, he 
was seen as a crucial swing vote in Monell—a vote that Justice Brennan 
believed he needed in order to reverse Monroe and make cities liable under 
§ 1983.  Third, and most important, the Justice had become Felix 
Frankfurter’s posthumous champion.  He had decided that Frankfurter had 
been right and that § 1983 was intended to reach only those violations that 
were actually authorized by state or local law.  Thus, just as he believed that 
Douglas was wrong to exempt cities from suits, he also believed that 
Douglas was wrong to reject Frankfurter’s narrow view of color of law. 
What would be the logical strategy for such a Justice?  If he had the votes 
to do so, Frankfurter’s champion would work toward a decision under 
which both cities and individuals could be sued under § 1983, but under 
which neither cities nor individuals would be liable unless the constitutional 
violation was actually authorized by state or local law.  However, if he 
lacked the votes to overrule Monroe’s color of law holding, his optimal 
strategy would be to seek half a loaf:  a decision under which cities were 
subjected to § 1983 suits, but only for violations that actually executed or 
implemented official city policy—in other words, the actual decision in 
Monell. 
The Frankfurter-inspired Justice described above had a real life 
counterpart, Lewis Powell.  He was convinced that cities should be suable 
under § 1983.  He was seen as a pivotal vote in Monell—in fact, it appears 
that he carefully positioned himself to be the swing Justice in the case.  
And, firmly convinced that Frankfurter had been right in Monroe, he had 
become Frankfurter’s champion.33
A.  “I am persuaded”:  Powell and Municipal Non-liability 
  Justice Powell seems to have sought the 
result one would expect a Frankfurter-inspired justice to seek:  a decision 
permitting § 1983 suits against cities but only to the extent that doing so 
was consistent with Frankfurter’s narrow view of color of law. 
Almost from the beginning, Powell appears to have been convinced that 
Monroe’s municipal non-liability rule was wrong.  His clerk’s pre-argument 
bench memo took the position that “Monroe’s exclusion of municipalities 
from the coverage of [§ 1983] is a judicial redefinition of the statute not 
supported by its text or legislative history,”34 and it seems clear that Justice 
Powell agreed.35
 
 33. Justice Stewart, whose role is discussed infra, text accompanying notes 
  In a subsequent memo to the conference, Powell wrote, 
173–84, may 
have had the same goal.  I hope to be able to discuss Stewart’s strategy and motivation more 
thoroughly and with more confidence after reviewing his recently released unpublished 
papers. 
 34. Bench Memorandum from Samuel Estreicher to Justice Powell 1 (Oct. 18, 1977), in 
Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 2. 
 35. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing 
Justice Powell as saying, “Not supported by legislative history”).  While it is possible that 
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“As to the legislative history debate, I am persuaded that Bill Douglas’ 
reading of it in Monroe was wrong.”36  And, of course, in his concurring 
opinion, he argued that Monroe’s municipal non-liability ruling was so 
clearly wrong and so indefensible based on the legislative record that it 
justified disregarding stare decisis concerns even under the strictest 
standard for doing so.37
This is not surprising.  By the time of the post-argument conference, at 
least seven Justices believed that Douglas was wrong on the issue, although 
they were not all ready to reverse.
 
38  And, by the March 6 conference, even 
Justice Rehnquist was willing to “quite frankly concede that if at the time of 
[Monroe], the same thorough canvass of the legislative history had been 
made as we have done this Term, the Court should have concluded that the 
word ‘person’ in 1983 did not exclude municipal corporations.”39  The 
Justices disagreed about how certain they were that Douglas’s position was 
wrong—Rehnquist writing that “the balance [was] about sixty-forty,”40 
while Justice Stevens arguing that it was “much more than sixty-forty”41—
but, with the possible exception of Chief Justice Burger,42
 
this phrase referred to Monroe’s color of law holding, in light of Powell’s subsequent 
statements, it seems somewhat more likely that Powell was speaking about the municipal 
non-liability holding. See infra notes 
 they all agreed 
that it was wrong. 
36–37 and accompanying text. 
 36. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference 1 (Feb. 23, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 5.  In addition to believing that municipal non-
liability was wrong as a matter of history, Powell believed that it should be eliminated for 
two practical reasons:  First, in his view, it would have little effect in the real world because 
cities generally indemnified their employees. Id. at 2–3.  Second, he feared that the absence 
of municipal § 1983 liability might lead to an unrestricted, judge-made remedy against 
municipalities similar to the remedy against federal employees recognized in Bivens. Id. at 
9–10; see also, sources cited supra, note 15. 
 37. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 705 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“[Monroe’s] reading, in light of today’s thorough canvass of the legislative history, clearly 
‘misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision.’” (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
 38. See infra text accompanying notes 43–51. 
 39. Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference 1 (Mar. 6, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 6; Rough Draft Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist 
to Conference 1 (Mar. 6, 1978), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 6 
(delivered to Justice Powell—and apparently not to the other Justices—on Mar. 5, 1978). 
 40. Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference 1 (Mar. 6, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 6. 
 41. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes [Second Conference] 1 (Mar. 6, 1978), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 430:  File 8 (paraphrasing Stevens as saying, “Error 
much more than 60-40 in Monroe”); see also Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes [Second 
Conference] 1 (Mar. 6, 1978), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 1, at Box 258:  File 2 
(paraphrasing Stevens as saying, “Odds greater than 60/40 on the error of Monroe”). 
 42. There appears to be nothing in the Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, or Powell papers 
on Monell indicating that Burger ever wrote or said anything at all on the issue other than 
possibly saying that he saw “no basis for overruling Monroe.” Justice Brennan, Conference 
Notes [Second Conference], supra note 41, at 1. 
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B.  “I am not at rest”:  Powell as the Critical Fifth Vote 
That Justice Powell was convinced that Monroe had been wrong on the 
municipal non-liability issue did not mean that he was willing to overrule 
the case or that he was willing to telegraph that conviction to the other 
Justices.  Instead, it appears that he carefully positioned himself to be the 
critical fifth vote that Brennan would need to have a majority. 
Following its ordinary practice, the Court met in conference on 
November 4, 1978, to discuss and take an initial vote on the cases it had 
heard that week, including Monell.  The Justices’ notes on that conference 
paint a somewhat confusing picture.43  There appeared to be two Justices, 
Chief Justice Burger44 and Justice Rehnquist,45 who were firmly committed 
to affirming based on Monroe’s municipal non-liability rule.  The 
remaining Justices all seemed to agree that the municipal non-liability rule 
was wrong,46 but that did not mean that Justice Brennan had five votes to 
reverse.  Justice Blackmun said he felt bound by stare decisis to affirm, 
particularly in light of congressional inaction on the issue.47  Justice Stewart 
first voted to reverse but, before the end of the conference, changed his vote 
to a “pass.”48
 
 43. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 
  It appeared that Brennan could count on his own vote and 
29, at 1–2; Justice Brennan, 
Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1–2; Justice Powell, Conference Notes 1–3 (Nov. 4, 
1977), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 3. 
 44. As was often the case, Chief Justice Burger attempted to maintain control over 
opinion assignment by stating that he was passing even though he made it clear that he 
intended to vote to affirm. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (Burger 
passing but stating that the district is not a person under Monroe); Justice Brennan, 
Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (Burger stating that case should be dismissed because 
district is not a person under Monroe); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 1 
(Burger affirming or passing but stating that Monroe will control); see also Memorandum 
from Justice Burger to Justice Brennan 1 (Nov. 12, 1977), in Marshall Papers, supra note 1, 
at Box 200:  File 11 (indicating that he would vote to reverse although he passed in 
conference). 
 45. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (Rehnquist votes to 
affirm); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 3 (same). 
 46. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1–2; Justice Brennan, 
Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1–2; Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, 
at 1–3.  In fact, even Justice Rehnquist may have indicated at the November 4 conference 
that he thought Monroe’s municipal non-liability was wrong as a matter of history but that 
he would uphold it based on stare decisis considerations. Justice Blackmun, Conference 
Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Justice Rehnquist as saying that “Monroe [was] 
debatable as to police acting under color and as to construction of the Sherman 
Amendment”); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 3 (paraphrasing 
Rehnquist as saying, “Monroe was wrongly decided but it is firmly established”).  
 47. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2; Justice Powell, Conference 
Notes, supra note 43, at 2.  While Blackmun eventually voted to reverse, he gave no 
indication that he would do so until four months later. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun 
to Conference 1 (Mar. 6, 1978), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 1, at Box 257:  File 11. 
 48. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (Stewart marked “Reverse” 
but then later marked as “Pass”); Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 
(Stewart marked as “Will pass”); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 1 
(Stewart marked “Reverse (tentative)” but that is crossed out and replaced with “Pass (on 
2nd vote)”). 
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those of Justices Marshall, Stevens, and probably White,49 which gave him 
four of the five he needed.  And, at the end of the first conference, Brennan 
may have thought that Justice Powell would be the fifth vote to reverse.  
Powell’s own conference notes counted him as a vote to reverse, although a 
tentative one.50  Justice Brennan’s notes indicated that he too thought 
Powell was a tentative vote to reverse.51
But shortly after the conference, Justice Powell withdrew that vote.
 
52  
Stating that his initial position had been “about as tentative as a vote can 
be,” he wrote the Chief that he was “not at rest, and wanted you—and [the] 
members of the Conference—to know this before assignments are made” 
since this meant that there was no longer a “Court,” (i.e., a majority to 
reverse or to affirm).53  “If any Justice is disposed to circulate a 
memorandum,” he wrote, “I am sure I would find it helpful.”54
There is another factor that may have caused Justice Brennan to be 
particularly solicitous of Justice Powell’s views.  When deeply engrossed in 
the study of one case, it is easy to forget that the Justices deal with many 
cases at the same time and that particular Justices may have been more 
concerned about one of the other cases.  It is likely that Justice Brennan 
considered Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
  Thus, in a 
polite way, Powell announced that he was the swing Justice and told Justice 
Brennan that he would need to craft his proposed opinion in a way that 
would garner Powell’s vote. 
55
 
 49. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 
 to be among 
the most important cases of the 1977 term and seems even more likely that 
he considered it to be substantially more significant than Monell.  The two 
cases were argued less than a month apart and were discussed by the Court 
29, at 1–2; Justice Brennan, 
Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1–2; Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, 
at 1–3.  Justice White’s vote may have appeared tentative because, although he indicated 
willingness to reverse, he also indicated that he was very close to Potter Stewart’s position 
and, as discussed later, Stewart eventually passed. 
 50. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 3 (showing his own vote as 
“Reverse (tentative),” and showing the total vote as five to reverse, two to affirm, and two 
passing).  Justice Blackmun also marked Powell as a vote to reverse with a question mark. 
Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2. 
 51. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2. 
 52. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger 1 (Nov. 11, 1977), in 
Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  When there was “no court,” the ordinary practice was for the Chief Justice to ask 
a member of each bloc to draft a memorandum rather than a proposed opinion. 
Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Conference 1 (Nov. 11, 1977), in Powell Papers, 
supra note 1, at Box 189: File 3.  Such “no-court” memoranda may be somewhat less formal 
than draft opinions and are intended to persuade undecided Justices by setting forth the 
arguments in favor of each side’s position.  Major portions of such memoranda are 
frequently incorporated into the final opinion, but other portions—alternative arguments, 
fallback positions, or more extreme proposals that fail to muster a majority—may never see 
the light of day.  For a discussion of Justice Brennan’s “no-court” memorandum in Monell, 
see infra text accompanying notes 130–36. 
 55. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (argued Oct. 12, 1977). 
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at the same “special conference” on March 6, 1978.56  Given the 
importance of the affirmative action issue to Justice Brennan and the 
centrality of Justice Powell’s vote in Bakke, it is possible that Brennan was 
particularly eager to accommodate Powell’s views in Monell.57
C.  “Frankfurter was right”:  Powell’s Narrow View of Color of Law 
 
By the end of the Court’s post-argument conference on Monell, Brennan 
seems to have had a pretty good idea what Powell’s views were.  Brennan’s 
notes paraphrase Powell as saying that “Frankfurter was right in Monroe v. 
Pape.  Never made sense to say those cops acted in ‘color of state action.’  
Would go with idea that when policy of body violates constitution[,] that’s 
violation of 1983 by a ‘person.’”58  Powell tied what became Monell’s 
“policy” requirement, not to legislative history or to text, but rather to the 
meaning of “under color of” law.  For Powell, if the Court was going to 
overturn Monroe’s municipal non-liability rule, it would have to do so in a 
way that restricted—or at least did not extend—Monroe’s color of law 
holding. Powell’s own notes indicate that he told the conference, “I do not 
want to extend Monroe.”59
Powell’s adherence to the narrow view of “color of law” and his desire to 
restrict the impact of Monroe’s broader interpretation was not a new 
development.  At least as early as 1975, Powell had become convinced that 
Frankfurter was right on the issue and that it was crucial to find a way to 
limit the effect of the Monroe majority’s opinion.  At home in Richmond 
that summer, Powell wrote himself a memo titled “Limitations on § 
1983”
 
60 to record his thoughts on the upcoming case of Paul v. Davis.61  In 
the memo, he criticized the “trend of judicial authority” which gave § 1983 
an expansive interpretation and stated that he “probably would have joined” 
Frankfurter’s “prophetic” Monroe dissent.62  However, given that 
overruling Monroe appeared unlikely,63 he went on to ask what options 
“Monroe le[ft] open” as ways to limit § 1983 suits for acts that were 
“unauthorized and contrary to state law.”64
 
 56. Memorandum from Justice Burger to Conference 1 (Feb. 27, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 
  A few days later, he wrote a 
1, at Box 434:  File 3. 
 57. For a discussion of Brennan’s efforts to enlist Powell as an ally during the 1977–78 
term, see SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN:  LIBERAL CHAMPION 443–49, 
451–55 (2010). 
 58. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2; see also Justice Blackmun, 
Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Powell as saying, “Felix Frankfurter 
[was] right in Monroe”); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 3 (paraphrasing 
himself as saying, “I think F.F. was right in Monroe”). 
 59. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 3 (paraphrasing himself as 
saying, “I do not want to extend Monroe.  I could open it up for this type of case and tighten 
it with respect to the Monroe v Pape factual situation.”). 
 60. Justice Powell, Limitations on § 1983 (July 31, 1975), in Powell Papers – Burrell, 
supra note 1, at Box 178:  File 1 [hereinafter Powell, Limitations]. 
 61. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 62. Powell, Limitations, supra note 60, at 1–2. 
 63. Id. at 2–3. 
 64. Id. at 3–5.  In this memo, he concluded that requiring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies was “the most hopeful limitation.” Id. at 5. 
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second memorandum to himself in which he complained that, “[i]f the slate 
were clean, [Paul v. Davis] would hardly merit discussion,” but that 
Monroe made the case “difficult to resolve in any rational way.”65  Around 
the same time, Powell’s handwritten notes on his law clerk’s summer 
project memo showed similar frustration.66
This frustration came to a head the following year as the Court 
considered Burrell v. McCray, a case that raised, but did not resolve, the 
question of whether prisoners should be required to exhaust administrative 
remedies before suing under § 1983.
 
67  The Court eventually dismissed 
certiorari as improvidently granted,68 but not before Justice Powell made it 
clear to his colleagues that he firmly believed that Monroe was wrong on 
the color of law issue.69  On the day of the oral argument, he wrote himself 
a memo that contained a section explaining why Monroe should be 
overruled.70  “Had I been on the Court,” he wrote, “I would have joined 
Frankfurter’s dissent in Monroe v. Pape.  Few cases in the history of the 
Court have distorted the purpose, and legislative history, of a statute more 
than Douglas’ opinion in Monroe.”71
The memo spelled out the action he planned to take if the Court rejected 
the exhaustion requirement.  Monroe so severely imbalanced the structure 
of federalism that he would be willing to overrule it despite his normal 
concern for stare decisis.
 
72
 
 65. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Self:  Paul and McDaniel v. Davis 4 (Aug. 4, 
1975), in Powell Papers – Civil Rights, supra note 
  “I am prepared at least to consider dissenting in 
1, at Box 131:  File [6]. 
 66. Memorandum from J. Phillip Jordan to Justice Powell on Case Law Background 3 
(undated [approx. July 31, 1975]), in Powell Papers – Civil Rights, supra note 1, at Box 131:  
File [5].  Powell underlined a passage that described Monroe’s color of law rule as “an 
interpretation of the section that may be true to its language but certainly is divorced from 
its purpose.” Id. at 3.  He also annotated the memo’s description of Monroe’s color of law 
reasoning with notes such as “Douglas’ rewriting of the statute, its history and purpose,” id. 
at 12, and “Distortion of 1983 and its history.” Id. at 15. 
 67. 426 U.S. 471, 473 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ as 
improvidently granted).  The issue was eventually resolved legislatively by the Civil Rights 
of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997j (2006), and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  Outside the prisoner litigation 
context, the Court has held, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Powell, that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is not required. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); 
id. at 532–536 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 68. Burrell, 426 U.S. at 471. 
 69. See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.  Powell’s jaundiced view of Monroe 
appears to have been reinforced by a memo from his clerk who argued that the only feasible 
way to contain the damaging effects of Monroe was to overrule it. Memorandum from J. 
Phillip Jordan to Justice Powell:  Burrell v. McCray 7–8 (Apr. 22, 1976), in Powell Papers – 
Burrell, supra note 1, at Box 178:  File 2. 
 70. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Self:  Burrell v. McCray (Apr. 27, 1976), in 
Powell Papers – Burrell, supra note 1, at Box 178:  File 3. 
 71. Id. at 5.  While this quote (and others) suggest that Justice Powell was attempting to 
be faithful to the legislative will of the 42nd Congress, there were also passages indicating 
that he was concerned, as a policy matter, about what he saw as Monroe’s distorting effect 
on federal-state relations. See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (discussing “powerful policy considerations 
militating against allowing 1983 suits being brought directly in federal courts . . . [and] 
strongly support[ing] overruling Monroe v. Pape”). 
 72. Id. at 6. 
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this case (I am sure no majority would agree with me) on the ground that 
Monroe should be overruled, and the Frankfurter rationale adopted as the 
only position consistent with principle and sound public policy.”73
 In the Court’s post-argument conference on Burrell, Powell told the 
Justices that he intended to do so.
 
74  After the initial discussion, Powell 
counted seven votes to reject the position that exhaustion should be 
required;75 and he informed the Justices that he was considering writing a 
dissent on the color of law issue.76
Powell’s Monell papers reinforce the conclusion that he saw the case as 
an opportunity to apply the narrow Frankfurter view of color of law to suits 
against municipalities.  He repeatedly redrew the boundary of municipal 
liability to conform to the color of law line.  For example, in his notes in 
preparation for the November 4 conference, he began by saying that 
Monroe’s municipal non-liability rule was too broad because Congress had 
not opposed all municipal liability, only vicarious liability.
  Since the case was dismissed as 
improvidently granted, Powell wrote no dissent, but he had put the Justices 
on notice. 
77  But he then 
recast this as opposition to liability that exceeded the Frankfurter color of 
law rule:  “[The Sherman Amendment] was rejected because Congress did 
not want to impose vicarious liability on local governments (e.g., for action 
violative of state or local law—as in the Monroe situation when conduct of 
[the] police was violative of Illinois law).”78  He then reiterated that 
municipalities should be suable for action pursuant to official policy 
because such actions, unlike unauthorized actions, were within the proper 
meaning of “color of law”:  “Congress gave no indication of intent to 
absolve municipalities for unconstitutional action taken by responsible 
officials in course of their duty pursuant to established policy:  E.g., here 
Board of Education acted officially in adopting pregnancy policy.  Thus 
there was ‘color of state’ law.”79
Similarly, when Powell described his desired version of the Monell 
doctrine, he regularly did so in phrases that were strikingly parallel to the 
ones he used to describe his view of the color of law requirement.  Powell’s 
Monell memoranda argued that “[m]unicipal entities would be suable for 
constitutional wrongs [that were] authorized,”
 
80
 
 73. Id. at 5. 
 but not for “tortious 
conduct of individual officials that was neither mandated nor specifically 
 74. Justice Powell, Conference Notes on Burrell v. McCray 2 (Apr. 30, 1976), in Powell 
Papers – Burrell, supra note 1, at Box 178:  File 3. 
 75. Id. at 1 (showing the vote as “Affirmed on Exhaustion 7-2”). 
 76. Id. at 2 (paraphrasing himself as saying, “I may write on ‘color of law’ issue”). 
 77. Justice Powell, Pre-Conference Notes 1 (Nov. 3, 1977), in Powell Papers, supra note 
1, at Box 189:  File 3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  Although this portion of Powell’s notes is headed “Petitioner’s basic argument,” 
the argument regarding color of state law appears nowhere in any of the briefs. 
 80. Justice Powell, Notes 3 (Mar. 5, 1978), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  
File 6. 
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authorized by, and indeed was violative of, state or local law.”81  Powell’s 
Burrell memoranda used quite similar phrases to explain the Douglas-
Frankfurter color of law debate.  In one, Powell criticized the Monroe 
majority for holding “that § 1983 applies in an otherwise proper case even 
though the state action is unauthorized and contrary to state law.” 82  In 
another, he explained that actions should be held to be under color of law 
only if they were either “taken pursuant to statutory authority” or “taken 
within [the officer’s] permissible discretion and not in violation of any state 
law.”83  Thus, Powell’s criteria were the same:  he believed that the color of 
law requirement was not met if the official’s action was unauthorized or 
violated state law, and he wanted the Monell doctrine to exempt cities if the 
official’s conduct was unauthorized or violated state law.84
For Powell, one of the principal reasons to overturn Monroe’s blanket 
municipal non-liability rule was to bring the effective interpretation of 
§ 1983 closer to the Frankfurter view.  An unsent draft memorandum to 
Justice Stewart indicated that Powell was willing to overcome his 
reluctance to expand § 1983 liability because the existing non-liability rule 
denied relief “for the actions of local governmental units bearing a direct 
responsibility for constitutional deprivation, even though such actions are 
fully consistent with, indeed mandated by, state law,” and this turned the 
Frankfurter-Douglas color of law debate “on its head.”
 
85  Affirming the 
lower court’s decision would be anomalous, limiting § 1983 liability to 
“unauthorized state action, the very conduct that Felix Frankfurter argued 
was not encompassed by the ‘under color of’ wording of the statute.”86
 
 81. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference 7 (Feb. 23, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 
  In 
his concurring opinion, he argued that the rule distorted the reach of the 
1, at Box 189:  File 5. 
 82. Powell, Limitations, supra note 60, at 2–3; see also id. at 2 (conduct in Monroe “not 
only was unauthorized but was contrary to Illinois law”). 
 83. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Self, supra note 70, at 5. 
 84. Powell was not the only Justice who defined the municipal liability boundary in a 
language that could equally describe Frankfurter’s concept of “color of law.”  In the post-
hearing conference, Justice White said cities should be liable only when “agents are doing 
precisely what [they are] authorized to do.” Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 
29, at 1; see also Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (paraphrasing 
Justice White as saying, “Where agents do precisely what they’re authorized to do, body 
should be ‘person’ for purposes of liability”).  Similarly, Justice Stewart later wrote Justice 
Brennan that a city should be liable only for “the affirmative, deliberate, knowing official 
action of its governing body.” Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Brennan 1 (Apr. 
26, 1978), in Marshall Papers, supra note 1, at Box 200:  File 11. 
 85. Draft Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Stewart 1–2 (undated), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 9 (draft prepared by Samuel Estreicher approximately 
Feb. 19, 1978).  The significance of this draft is somewhat difficult to evaluate.  As far as 
can be determined from Justice Powell’s papers, it was not sent in this form to Justice 
Stewart or any other Justice.  The two memoranda into which the draft was converted—and 
which were sent—did not contain the language quoted in the text. Memorandum from 
Justice Powell to Conference [draft hand-delivered to Justice Stewart only] (Feb. 21, 1978), 
in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 4; Memorandum from Justice Powell to 
Conference, supra note 36.  Nonetheless, it is likely that Powell’s clerk was reasonably 
accurate in reflecting the Justice’s thinking, even if Powell decided not to convey those 
thoughts in writing to his brethren. 
 86. Draft Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Stewart, supra note 85, at 2. 
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statute by denying recovery for violations that fit within even the narrowest 
definition of color of law: 
 The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history that would 
produce the anomalous result of immunizing local government units from 
monetary liability for action directly causing a constitutional deprivation, 
even though such actions may be fully consistent with, and thus not 
remediable under, state law. No conduct of government comes more 
clearly within the “under color of” state law language of § 1983.  It is 
most unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting under the 
command or the specific authorization of the government employer to be 
exclusively liable for resulting constitutional injury.87
Thus, Justice Powell believed that Monroe’s municipal non-liability rule 
was wrong, but was willing to withhold his crucial vote on that issue until 
he saw Justice Brennan’s opinion.  At the same time, he clearly 
communicated his position that Monroe’s color of law ruling was also 
wrong and that he did not want to extend it as part of a recognition of 
municipal liability.  Powell eventually gave Justice Brennan that crucial 
fifth vote, but only after Brennan circulated an opinion that accommodated 
Powell’s position—an opinion that permitted suits against cities, but only 
for violations that were within Powell’s (and Frankfurter’s) narrower 
definition of color of law.  And there is good reason to believe that this 
result was not coincidental:  Powell was engaged in an ongoing project of 
trying to find ways to limit what he saw as the pernicious effects of 
Monroe’s color of law ruling.  Accordingly, it seems likely that the odd 
outcome in Monell was the result of implicit bargaining by Justice Powell 
on behalf of the Frankfurter position on color of law. 
 
III.  FROM MONROE TO MONELL:  TWO ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Of course, the fact that the Frankfurter’s Champion hypothesis provides 
an explanation for Powell’s position in Monell does not necessarily mean 
that it provides the best explanation.  In this section, I will discuss the 
possibility that Powell’s position (and the Monell doctrine itself) might 
have been the result of legislative history arguments raised by the parties in 
their briefs or by the clerks or Justices in chambers.  First, I will examine 
the parties’ briefs and arguments and show that they cannot explain the 
Court’s adoption of the Monell doctrine or Powell’s support for it.  Then I 
will discuss a more plausible alternative, that Justice Powell became 
convinced that the legislative history of § 1983 restricted the ambit of the 
Act to “actual wrongdoers,” i.e., to defendants who were at fault.  Finally, I 
will explain why this actual wrongdoer theory seems not to be a satisfactory 
explanation for Powell’s support for the Monell doctrine. 
 
 87. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 707 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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A.  “The power that is theirs”:  The Parties’ Briefs and Arguments 
After the opinion was handed down, Monell immediately became known 
as the case that overruled Monroe’s municipal non-liability holding; but 
that was not the way the case was briefed or argued.  The petitioners and 
their amici National Education Association and Lawyers’ Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law (NEA) correctly anticipated that a proposal to 
flatly overrule Monroe would provoke substantial resistance within the 
Court on stare decisis grounds.88  They also knew that much of the strength 
of their position resulted from the stare decisis effect of the line of cases 
that had permitted § 1983 suits against school boards.89  As a result, they 
crafted their arguments to reconcile Monroe with the school board cases 
and carefully avoided arguing that cities should be subject to suit or that 
Monroe should be overruled.  The petitioners explicitly stated, “Thus, the 
correctness of this Court’s prior holdings in Moore [sic] v. County of 
Alameda and Monroe v. Pape are not here at issue.”90  Similarly, the NEA, 
while arguing that the municipal non-liability rule was completely 
inconsistent with the legislative history, nonetheless explicitly declined to 
ask the Court to overrule Monroe on the issue.91
Instead, the petitioners and the NEA argued that Monroe could be 
distinguished.
 
92  Before turning to the distinctions that the petitioners 
actually advocated, it is important to recognize one distinction that they did 
not advocate.  They did not argue that Monroe should be distinguished on 
the basis that the liability in that case, unlike the liability claimed in Monell, 
was based on respondeat superior.93  None of the briefs filed by the 
petitioners or the NEA even mentions the phrase.94
 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 
 
43–51 and infra text accompanying notes 112–
28. 
 89. Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, 14–24, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978) (No. 75-1914), 1977 WL 187958, at *7–8, *13–24; NEA Brief, supra note 22, at 27–
32; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 90. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
(No. 75-1914), 1977 WL 187960, at *1; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
31, at 5 (quoting petitioners’ counsel as stating that “we don’t think our case presents the 
Court with the necessity of reconsidering” the holding that cities were not suable persons 
under section 1983). 
 91. NEA Brief, supra note 22, at 26 (“We do not challenge here the holding of Monroe 
v. Pape.  Soundly based or not, the decision there that municipalities are not ‘persons’ under 
Section 1983, twice relied upon in recent decisions, may well be entitled to stare decisis 
effect.”); id. at 31a–32a (“The holding in Monroe was erroneous. . . .  But however 
erroneous, this holding may be deemed to be stare decisis.”). 
 92. The petitioners also asserted a fallback position suggesting that partial relief could be 
based on the district court’s power to issue preliminary injunctions.  The petitioners argued 
that, since the district court had the power to issue a preliminary injunction ordering the 
board members to reinstate and pay employees until a decision was reached on the prayer for 
a permanent injunction, it also had the power to order the lesser relief of payment for the 
same period without reinstatement. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 11, 69–75.  
Obviously, this argument provided no support for the ultimate outcome in Monell, and was 
entirely unrelated to any distinctions between authorized and unauthorized wrongs or 
between respondeat superior and other bases for municipal liability. 
 93. The Justices sharply disagreed on the question of whether Monroe could actually be 
distinguished on the basis that the sole claim of liability was respondeat superior. Compare 
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The petitioners’ first argument was that school districts were different 
than cities and counties and therefore that Monroe’s municipal non-liability 
rule should not apply to independent school districts at all.95  This 
argument—which was the only one in which the petitioners suggested that a 
governmental entity itself should be liable—never so much as hinted that 
school districts should be exempt from respondeat superior liability or from 
liability for unauthorized actions of district officials.  Instead, it claimed 
that Monroe simply did not apply to school districts and therefore that 
school districts were “persons” who could be sued like any other 
“person.”96
The petitioners’ second argument did not seek to make governmental 
entities liable at all, so it seems an unlikely source for an explanation for 
Monell’s restriction of such liability.
 
97
This argument was based on the fact that, unlike Monroe, Monell was not 
a damage suit against the city itself, but instead an equitable action brought 
  Nonetheless, it merits closer 
examination because it does draw a line—albeit a different line than that 
drawn by Monell—between certain constitutional violations for which 
monetary relief would be available and others for which it would not. 
 
supra, text accompanying notes 112–28, with Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice 
Brennan (Apr. 12, 1978), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (arguing that 
Monroe cannot be distinguished).  After substantial negotiation among the Justices, Justice 
Brennan’s final opinion avoided taking a position on the issue. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 n.66 (1978). 
 94. Unlike the briefs of the petitioners and the NEA, the respondents’ brief mentions 
respondeat superior in two passages.  However, as one would expect, neither passage 
contends that Monroe should be interpreted as permitting governmental entity liability in the 
non-respondeat superior situation. Brief for Respondent, supra note 22, at 9–11 (recognizing 
that the liability imposed by the Sherman Amendment was different than “traditional 
principles of respondeat superior” but arguing that Congress thought it entirely lacked the 
power to make municipalities liable); id. at 32–34 (stating that, for egregious violations of 
constitutional rights, “an argument could be made for the imposition of respondeat superior 
liability” under § 1983, but taking the position that the Court should adopt a blanket 
immunity rule applicable both to innocent and egregious violations).  The respondents’ brief 
also mentioned “vicarious liability” but only in the context of arguing that the petitioners 
were not asserting vicarious liability, but were instead asserting a harsh form of strict 
liability. Id. at 11 n.*. 
  Finally, there is one reference to “respondeat superior” in the oral argument. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 11–12.  In response to a question, petitioners’ 
counsel agreed that his argument for suits against officials in their official capacity did not 
depend on respondeat superior since such suits were against the actual wrongdoing official.  
This was clearly not an argument that there was anything about the text or history of § 1983 
that would bar respondeat superior liability. 
 95. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89; see also NEA Brief, supra note 22, at 27–32 
(amici’s second argument).  While this argument was subject to some questioning during 
oral argument, it seems to have been virtually ignored by the Justices with the exception of 
Justice Marshall, who expressed some passing interest. Memorandum from Phillip Spector 
to Justice Marshall (Nov. 3, 1977), in Marshall Papers, supra note 1, at Box 195:  File 10. 
 96. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 24–31; see also NEA Brief, supra note 22, at 
32. 
 97. Since the petitioners’ second argument did not attempt to make the city itself liable, 
it did not and could not depend on respondeat superior. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 31, at 11–12. 
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against particular officials in their official capacity asking them to use their 
existing power to undo the wrong they had committed98
As to the defendant officials, petitioners would have the Court note that 
they do not assert that New York City is liable for all violations of its 
employees, but only that officials who have used their powers to violate 
the Constitution can be compelled to use those same powers to remedy 
the violation.
: 
99
This argument did recognize a limit on the remedial power of the court, 
but not the limit created by the Monell doctrine, i.e., it did not restrict 
liability to situations in which the wrong was committed by someone whose 
acts could fairly be described as official policy.  The court’s power did not 
depend on whether the wrongdoer was authorized to commit the wrong, but 
instead depended on whether the wrongdoer had the power to undo the 
wrong.
 
100  Under this “power that is theirs” restriction, officials who had 
committed a particular wrong could be required to repair that wrong using 
public resources only if the state had granted them the power to do so.101
The theory is applicable only where the wrongdoing officials hold 
positions of responsibility empowering them to provide the relief sought.  
Not every act of misconduct by every municipal employee can lead to an 
order against him in his official capacity impacting upon the public 
treasury.  The courts can do no more than order wrongdoing officials to 
exercise “the power that is theirs” to right the wrongs which they have 
committed through their offices.  Although a court may have jurisdiction 
over a public official, it cannot instill him with powers to undo his wrong 
which he does not possess by virtue of his office.
  
The question was not whether the wrong was authorized but rather whether 
the defendant wrongdoer had the authority to grant the remedy.  As NEA’s 
brief stated the argument: 
102
If the relief sought was money to be paid from the city or school district 
treasury, the availability of relief would depend on whether the wrongdoer 
had the power of the purse—not whether he or she had authority to commit 
the wrong.
 
103
 
 98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
 
89, at 3. 
 99. Id. at 8–9. 
 100. Id. at 37 (“Where, as here, it is within the authority of the defendants to provide the 
plaintiffs with the back pay required to fully remedy the unlawful conduct, the district court 
can compel them ‘to exercise the power that is theirs.’”); see also Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 31, at 9. 
 101. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 8–9, 32–35; Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 31, at 9–10 (petitioner’s counsel stating that the individual defendants in their 
official capacities could only be required to pay any judgment by using the funds over which 
the state had granted them power). 
 102. NEA Brief, supra note 22, at 7 n.3 (internal citations omitted).  The same point was 
made in oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 11 (stating that the 
plaintiff in Monroe could not have sued the mayor because he was not the wrongdoer and 
could not have sued the police officer to compel him to pay money from the city treasury 
because the officer had “no authority to dispense public funds to make whole injured 
plaintiffs”). 
 103. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 33–34 (stating that monetary relief would only 
be available if the wrongdoer was a high ranking official with authority to direct 
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The distinction between the plaintiffs’ “power that is theirs” restriction 
and the Monell doctrine can be illustrated by the situation in Pembaur v. 
City of Cincinnati.104  In Pembaur, the Court determined that the Hamilton 
County Prosecuting Attorney had the authority to make county policy with 
regard to searches and seizures by county sheriffs.105  Under Monell, that 
made the county liable for damages resulting from an illegal search that the 
prosecutor authorized.106  But under Ohio law, the prosecutor does not have 
authority to appropriate county funds or to approve or pay settlements with 
such funds.107  As a result, although Hamilton County was liable under the 
position adopted by the Monell Court, it would not have been liable if the 
Court had adopted the “power that is theirs” restriction advanced by the 
plaintiffs and their amici.  Under that restriction, the Court could not have 
ordered the prosecutor to pay county funds because it could not give him a 
power that he did not have under state law.108
This “power that is theirs” restriction on official capacity suits was not 
compelled or even suggested by the language or legislative history of  
§ 1983, and the petitioners made no argument that it was.
 
109  Instead the 
restriction was seen as an inherent limit on the remedial power of the 
federal courts in official capacity suits, a limit that resulted from the fact 
that any such suit—regardless of its statutory basis—could only order a 
defendant to exercise whatever authority he or she possessed.110
Thus, the petitioners’ second argument simply cannot explain Justice 
Powell’s willingness to support the Monell doctrine.  The Monell doctrine 
eliminates liability unless the wrongdoer acted pursuant to state or local 
  But once 
the Court eliminated the need for official capacity suits by overruling 
Monroe and permitting direct suits against the governmental entity itself, 
the basis for the “power that is theirs” restriction simply disappeared. 
 
expenditures).  The brief does predict that the “primary application [of the “power that is 
theirs” argument] will be in instances where, as here, the highest officials of a city or county 
adopt or effect an official policy directing, in violation of the constitution that money be 
taken or withheld from the aggrieved plaintiffs,” but makes it clear that the propriety of such 
a suit results from the fact that such officials have “official power to restore funds unlawfully 
withheld.” Id. at 34–35 (emphasis added). 
 104. 475 U.S. 469 (1986). 
 105. Id. at 484–85. 
 106. Id. 
 107. That power is vested in the County Commissioners. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 307.55 
(LexisNexis 2003). 
 108. NEA Brief, supra note 22, at 7 n.3. 
 109. The petitioners did make a plain language argument, but it was an argument that the 
language permits suits against officials in their official capacity rather than an argument in 
favor of the “power that is theirs” restriction on such suits. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
89, at 46–49. 
 110. Official capacity suits are, by definition, suits seeking to require defendants to 
exercise power that they possess by reason of the office that they hold.  They seek to bind 
whatever official holds the particular office, and (if they involve monetary relief) to require 
the official to order the expenditure of public funds rather than to pay any judgment from his 
personal assets. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 & n.11 (1985).  If the official 
leaves office during the pendency of the suit, his or her successor in office is automatically 
substituted since the suit seeks to require the defendant to exercise the power held by reason 
of his or her official position. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d). 
2011] FRANKFURTER’S CHAMPION 701 
authority; the “power that is theirs” restriction would have eliminated 
liability unless the wrongdoer had the power to correct the wrong.  The 
Monell doctrine was justified by arguments about § 1983’s legislative 
history; the “power that is theirs” restriction was based on the inherent 
nature of official capacity suits.  The Monell doctrine is a limit on § 1983 
damage suits against municipalities; the “power that is theirs” restriction 
assumes that such suits will not be permitted. 
B.  “When it bears some blame or fault”:  The Actual Wrongdoer Theory 
Unlike the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, the internal papers of the 
Justices do present a plausible alternative explanation for Justice Powell’s 
position—the possibility that Justice Powell had become convinced that 
Congress intended to limit § 1983 liability to “actual wrongdoers,”111
To understand the genesis of the “actual wrongdoer” theory, it is helpful 
to look in a little more detail at Justice Brennan’s difficult position after the 
Monell post-argument conference.  While he appeared to have four votes to 
reverse, even some of those were contingent.  Justice Stevens was willing to 
vote to reverse since he thought that Monroe was probably wrong
 i.e., 
to defendants who were at fault.  There is no question that Justice Powell 
(and his clerk, Samuel Estreicher) advocated the actual wrongdoer theory as 
a basis for limiting municipal liability.  However, Justice Powell’s ultimate 
abandonment of that advocacy casts doubt on the theory as an explanation 
for Monell. 
112 and 
that “the Court would look ridiculous to say [that a] school board [was] not 
a person.”113  But Stevens wanted to qualify or distinguish Monroe on some 
basis rather than overrule it.114  Justice Marshall wanted to reverse, but his 
position was unclear.  He wanted the court to be “as gentle as possible with 
Monroe v. Pape—leav[ing] it there and not extend[ing] it here.”115
 
 111. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference 2 (Feb. 23, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 5. 
  Justice 
 112. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 3; Justice Brennan, Conference 
Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Stevens as saying that he had “doubts about 
Monroe”). 
 113. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2; see also Justice Blackmun, 
Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Stevens as saying, “Court would look 
bad to say [a] School Board [was] not a person”); Justice Brennan, First Circulated Draft 
Memorandum (Jan 30, 1978), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 1, at Box 258:  File 2 
(paraphrasing Stevens as saying a ruling that school districts were not suable would make the 
Justices “look like fools”). 
 114. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Stevens as 
saying that Monroe should be limited based on the type of activity involved); Justice 
Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Stevens as saying that Monroe 
should be limited to cases involving police officers); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, 
supra note 43, at 3 (paraphrasing Stevens as saying that the Court “should qualify or 
distinguish” Monroe).  Stevens’s position would change and he would ultimately become the 
one Justice who most forcefully argued that it was impossible to distinguish Monroe yet still 
hold municipalities liable. See Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan, supra 
note 93. 
 115. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1.  Justice Powell’s notes 
indicate that Justice Marshall said he was “somewhere between Byron [White] and Potter 
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White was willing to reverse because he thought that Monroe was probably 
wrong and should not be extended. 116  However, he did not see the need to 
decide how far Monroe “should be cut back,” since at the very least, 
“[w]here agents do precisely what they’re authorized to do,” the 
governmental entity should be liable.117
When Brennan considered the critical swing Justices, the situation must 
have become even more complicated.  Potter Stewart, who spoke 
immediately after Brennan, seemed to be arguing for a way to reconcile 
Monroe and the school desegregation cases without overruling either.
 
118  
On the one hand, he saw Monroe as barring respondeat superior liability.119  
On the other, he saw the school desegregation cases as permitting suits 
against school boards (and, by implication, suits against cities) for “direct 
violations by the board” itself.120  Nonetheless, his position was not firm, 
and he asked to be marked as passing.121
 
[Stewart]” but that he (Justice Powell) did not understand what Marshall meant. Justice 
Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 
 
43, at 2. 
  Justice Marshall seemed to have been the Justice most concerned about the downside 
risk in Monell—the risk that the Court would affirm in a way that would seriously undercut 
the desegregation cases. See, e.g., Bench Memorandum from Phillip L. Spector to Justice 
Marshall 1–2 (Sept. 21, 1977), in Marshall Papers, supra note 1, at Box 195:  File 1. 
 116. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1; Justice Powell, 
Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 2. 
 117. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1; see also Justice Blackmun, 
Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (paraphrasing Justice White as saying that § 1983 was 
“intended to impose liability when agents are doing precisely what [they are] authorized to 
do”).  The available papers paint an unclear picture of Justice White’s thinking on municipal 
liability.  In the post-argument conference, he described a line that was very close to the one 
eventually drawn by the Court and, like a number of the Justices, he expressed a preference 
for not overruling Monroe. Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan 1 (Feb. 25, 
1978), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6.  On the other hand, he seemed 
dubious about the conclusion that cities should be exempt from respondeat superior liability. 
Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan 3 (Apr. 12, 1978), in Brennan Papers, 
supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (stating that White understood that Brennan was convinced 
of that conclusion but that White would be interested in whether others disagreed). 
 118. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (paraphrasing Stewart as 
saying that barring respondeat superior while permitting suits for violations committed by 
the city itself, “reconciles [Monroe] with all school desegregation cases”). 
 119. Id. (paraphrasing Stewart as saying, “City can not be sued on Respondeat Superior – 
this Monroe”); id. (paraphrasing Stewart as saying, “Not on Respondeat Superior or 
Sherman Amendment theory”); Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 
(paraphrasing Stewart as saying, “I think Monroe v. Pape bars suits against city on 
respondeat superior”); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 1 (paraphrasing 
Stewart as saying, “Have concluded tentatively that a city can’t be sued under theory of 
respondeat superior”). 
 120. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (paraphrasing Stewart as 
saying, “Entity can be sued for direct violations by itself.  This reconciles with all school 
desegregation cases.”); Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (paraphrasing 
Stewart as saying, “But school deseg cases make clear school board can be sued for direct 
violations by the board as here.  But even city ought be held to own direct acts.”); Justice 
Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 1 (paraphrasing Stewart as saying, “Our school 
board cases make clear that a school board may be sued itself for its own policies that are 
invalid”). 
 121. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (paraphrasing Stewart as 
saying that his position was “[s]ufficiently doubtful [that he should be] mark[ed] as Pass”); 
Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (“Will pass”); Justice Powell, 
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As previously discussed,122 Justice Powell used the post-argument 
conference in Monell to reiterate his belief that Frankfurter’s Monroe 
dissent had been right and that it “never made sense to say those cops acted 
in ‘color of state action.’”123  However, he was tentatively willing to “go 
with the idea that when policy of [a governmental] body violates [the] 
constitution,” the entity could be held liable under § 1983.124  As a result, 
he was “inclined to try to work this out along lines stated by Potter 
[Stewart].”125
Justice Powell was not alone in finding Stewart’s approach attractive.  
Justice White indicated that he was “[q]uite close to [Potter Stewart]—but 
not with him all [the] way,”
 
126 and Justice Marshall cryptically said that he 
was “[s]omewhere in between Byron and Potter.”127  On the other hand, 
Justice Stevens stated that his own position was not consistent with 
Stewart’s.128
As a result, Justice Brennan faced a daunting task.  Although the Chief 
Justice asked him to write a memorandum “along the lines expressed by 
you, Byron, Thurgood, and John,”
 
129
 
Conference Notes, supra note 
 Brennan could muster five votes only 
if his memorandum reconciled the not entirely consistent views of those 
four Justices and attracted at least one vote from Justices Stewart, Powell, 
43, at 1 (paraphrasing Stewart as saying his conclusions were 
tentative). 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 58–71. 
 123. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Justice 
Powell); see also Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing 
Powell as saying, “F[elix] Frankfurter right in Monroe”); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, 
supra note 43, at 3 (paraphrasing himself as saying, “I think F.F. was right in Monroe”). 
 124. Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Justice 
Powell).  Justice Brennan indicated that Powell’s position was “tentative,” id., and Justice 
Powell himself stated that he was “not at rest” and that he would “have to see how this 
writes” before firming up a final position, Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, 
at 3 (paraphrasing himself).  As discussed, supra, text accompanying notes 50–54, Powell 
quickly informed the Justices in writing that he was undecided and wanted to see competing 
memoranda before taking a final position. 
 125. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Powell as 
saying that he was “[l]eaning to [Potter Stewart] view”); Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, 
supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Justice Powell as saying that he “lean[ed] toward PS 
views”); Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 3 (paraphrasing himself).  
 126. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 2 (paraphrasing White); see also 
Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (paraphrasing White as saying, 
“Am not sure how I differ from Potter Stewart”). 
 127. Justice Powell, Conference Notes, supra note 43, at 2. 
 128. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 2 (paraphrasing Stevens as 
saying that his basis for distinguishing Monroe was “different from Potter Stewart”).  Justice 
Stevens eventually came to believe that Monroe could not be distinguished based on a non- 
respondeat superior rule since the Monroe plaintiffs had alleged a non-respondeat superior 
custom and usage theory claiming that the police were following standard department 
procedure. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan 1 (Apr. 12, 1978), in 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 1, at Box 257:  File 11.  As demonstrated by his dissent in 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, Justice Stevens also believed that the no respondeat superior rule 
was not supported by the legislative history of the statute. 471 U.S. 808, 835–41 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 129. Memorandum from Justice Burger to Justice Brennan (Nov. 12, 1977), in Marshall 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 200:  File 11. 
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or possibly Blackmun.  To create a majority, it appeared that he might need 
to craft an argument that reconciled Monroe and the desegregation cases on 
the basis that the former involved respondeat superior liability while the 
latter involved liability for conduct that was, in some sense, more directly 
attributable to the governmental entity’s governing body. 
The difficulty was not to state the distinction but to explain a reason why 
the distinction should make a difference.  Once a persuasive argument had 
been made that cities were “persons” and should be subject to suit, Brennan 
needed to develop a rationale for saying that they should not be subject to 
suit on the traditional basis normally applied to corporations and other 
entities—respondeat superior.  And, unlike Powell, he was hardly likely to 
endorse any justification that explicitly undermined Monroe’s color of law 
ruling. 
The rationale Brennan chose was the “actual wrongdoer” theory, the 
argument that a governmental entity should be liable only if it was at fault.  
In setting the boundaries of municipal liability, he argued, the Court should 
“fashion a doctrine of municipal ‘fault’ as required by history, reason, and 
the purpose of § 1983.”130  In this way, the Court could effectuate 
Congress’s intent that municipal liability should exist only if the municipal 
entity “as such” had violated the plaintiff’s rights.131
The cornerstone of this approach is that a municipal or quasi-muncipal 
body may be directly sued under § 1983 for any relief necessary to redress 
a constitutional deprivation when it bears some blame or fault for the 
constitutional infringement.  Conversely, where the body bears no 
significant responsibility for the harm suffered by a § 1983 plaintiff, it 
should not be vicariously liable to suit under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior:  for such liability without fault is precisely analogous to the 
liability imposed by the Sherman amendment, which the 1871 Congress 
refused to impose.
  He summarized the 
actual wrongdoer theory as follows: 
132
It is important to understand the logic of Justice Brennan’s position.  
Justice Brennan was not arguing that respondeat superior liability should be 
rejected because it was liability for acts that the city had not authorized, but 
rather because it was one example of liability for actions for which the city 
could not be blamed.  For Justice Brennan, respondeat superior liability 
was, by definition, limited to liability without employer fault,
 
133
 
 130. Justice Brennan, First Circulated Draft Memorandum, supra note 
 and it was 
113, at 8; see also, 
e.g., id. at 46 (municipality subject to suit only if it “bears a significant degree of 
responsibility for a constitutional deprivation”); Justice Brennan, Second Opinion Draft 33 
(Apr. 21, 1978), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (“In sum, a local 
government may be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983 when it 
is at fault, but not for the fault purely of its employees or agents.”). 
 131. Justice Brennan, First Circulated Draft Memorandum, supra note 113, at 8; see also 
id. at 29 (a municipality should be held liable “for it own violations”). 
 132. Id. at 46–47 (citations omitted). 
 133. Justice Brennan, First Opinion Draft 32 (Apr. 4, 1978), in Marshall Papers, supra 
note 1, at Box 200:  File 12 (defining respondeat superior as meaning “liability imposed on 
employers without regard to their fault or blame”).  This is why Brennan took the position 
2011] FRANKFURTER’S CHAMPION 705 
this lack of fault that made respondeat superior analogous to the liability 
that would have been imposed by the rejected versions of the Sherman 
Amendment.  Congress had rejected the first two versions, both of which 
would have made defendants liable even if they “did not know of an 
impending or ensuing riot or did not have the wherewithal to do anything 
about it . . . [and] even if [they] had done everything in [their] power to curb 
the riot.”134  But Congress then adopted the third version (the “second 
conference substitute”) which imposed liability on defendants “who, having 
the power to intervene against the Ku Klux violence,” failed to do so.135  
Both the rejected and the adopted versions imposed liability on defendants 
for conduct they had not authorized; the difference, Brennan argued, was 
that the rejected versions—like respondeat superior—imposed liability 
without fault, while the adopted version did not.136
Justice Brennan’s enunciation of this fault-based, actual wrongdoer 
theory was certainly not a surprise to Justice Powell.  His clerk, Samuel 
Estreicher, had suggested the same theory in a bench memo, stating that the 
legislative history supported suing officials in their official capacity since 
“there was no intention to shield the ‘wrongdoer’ from liability, even if the 
‘wrongdoing’ in question is simply a public official’s execution of a statute 
or policy authorized by local law.”
 
137
In addition, shortly before the Court’s post-argument conference, 
Estreicher had written Justice Powell, spelling out the actual wrongdoer 
approach in greater detail.
 
138
 
that municipal liability would be perfectly appropriate if there was municipal “fault in hiring, 
training, or direction” of employees. Id. at 34 n.61. 
  He explained that, in his view, Congress’s 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment was not an effort to protect municipal 
treasuries and did not indicate doubt about its power to make municipalities 
 134. Justice Brennan, Second Opinion Draft, supra note 130, at 31, 32 n.56. 
 135. Id. at 32 n.56. 
 136. Id.  The explanation of the logic of this argument, is not meant to suggest that the 
argument is persuasive. See supra, text accompanying notes 23–30.  The argument rests on 
the unexamined assumption that a governmental entity—which can, of course, only act 
through employees or agents—is only at fault if its “policy making” officials are personally 
at fault.  Brennan suggests no reason to accept that assumption or to disregard the obvious 
counterexamples.  In tort litigation, the fault of line employees is regularly attributed to 
corporate entities to establish negligence and even, in most states, the higher level of fault 
necessary for punitive damages. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 905 & n.1 (2001) 
(respondeat superior the norm); Achtenberg, supra note 20, at 2193 & n.56 (punitive 
damages).  As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, if cities are to be liable at all, it must be for the 
actions of some person, and there is no logical reason to distinguish between policy-making 
officials and subordinate officers. Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference, 
supra note 30, at 9; see also supra note 29. 
 137. Estreicher, supra note 34, at 18; see also id. at 19 (explaining that official capacity 
suits to recover moneys withheld pursuant to official authority would be consistent with 
rejection of respondeat superior and “would not involve the unfairness of imposing liability 
on municipalities who were without legal authority to prevent the unconstitutional conduct”).  
Both of these statements were in a section of the memo devoted to discussing the petitioners’ 
argument that the Court could permit suits against wrongdoing officials in their official 
capacity and that it could do so without overruling Monroe. 
 138. Memorandum from Samuel Estreicher to Justice Powell 1 (Nov. 4, 1977), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 3. 
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liable.139  Instead, it was rejected because “it imposed vicarious, indeed 
strict, liability [on municipalities] for the conduct of private individuals” 
even when the municipality did not have the ability to prevent that 
conduct.140  As a result, he continued, “The legislative history can best be 
understood as a [sic] limiting the statutory ambit to actual wrongdoers, i.e., 
a rejection of respondeat superior or other principle of vicarious 
liability.”141
Estreicher then turned to the question of when a governmental entity 
should be treated as the wrongdoer.  He recognized that a good argument 
could be made that wrongs of employees should be attributed to the entity 
whenever the employee acted under color of law, but discarded that 
argument because it had been “rejected in Monroe.”
 
142  He then 
reformulated the actual wrongdoer test in a way that would exclude 
municipal liability whenever the conduct fell outside the narrow definition 
of color of law:  a governmental entity should not be treated as the 
wrongdoer if the conduct “was not mandated or specifically authorized, and 
indeed may be violative of state or local law.”143
Powell must have been pleased with an approach that seemed to dovetail 
so nicely with his desire to resuscitate Frankfurter’s color of law position, 
particularly since it appears that his chambers may have been peddling that 
approach to some of the other Justices.
 
144  And, when Justice Brennan’s 
January 30 memorandum adopted the actual wrongdoer approach, Powell 
jumped on board.  On February 23, after reviewing competing memoranda 
from Justices Brennan and Rehnquist,145 Powell informed the conference 
that he had decided to reverse and that he agreed with the actual wrongdoer 
reading of the legislative history.146
 
 139. Id. 
  In his view, he wrote, “The legislative 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1 (stating that Estreicher had “heard through the ‘grapevine’ that some of the 
other Justices may be receptive” to the approach which he had previously discussed with 
Brennan).  Justice Powell may also have been attracted to the actual wrongdoer approach 
because it supported his position that municipalities should be given qualified immunity.  
See Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan 1 (Apr. 11, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (“[T]he emphasis in your [first draft] opinion on the 
‘fault’ principle and your recognition of the 42nd Congress’ rejection of the justifications for 
vicarious liability argue against the imposition of liability for innocent failure to predict the 
often uncertain course of constitutional adjudication.”). 
 145. Justice Brennan, First Circulated Draft Memorandum, supra note 113; Justice 
Rehnquist, Second Draft Memorandum (Jan. 31, 1978), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 1, at 
Box 258:  File 1.  Although Rehnquist’s memo was titled “Second Draft,” it appears to have 
been the first draft circulated to the conference as a whole and is the first draft found in the 
extant papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, or Powell.  Based on the fact that 
each of the two circulated memoranda refers to the arguments made in the other, it seems 
likely that Justices Brennan and Rehnquist had each prepared at least one earlier draft of 
their respective memoranda, which they had exchanged prior to the preparation of the 
generally circulated versions.  This is also suggested by the fact that the word “Circulated” in 
the title of Brennan’s January 30 memo was added by hand. 
 146. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference, supra note 111, at 1. 
2011] FRANKFURTER’S CHAMPION 707 
history can best be understood as limiting the statutory ambit to actual 
wrongdoers, i.e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any other principle of 
vicarious liability.”147
Justices Brennan’s and Rehnquist’s competing memoranda
 
148 had 
framed the debate between those who wanted to replace Monroe’s blanket 
municipal non-liability rule and those who wanted to reaffirm it in all 
respects.  After an additional flurry of memos149 (including Powell’s 
endorsing the actual wrongdoer theory), the case was set for a second 
conference on March 6.150
Powell’s continued adherence to the actual wrongdoer theory is 
evidenced by his response to a draft memo he received from Justice 
Rehnquist the day before that second conference.
 
151  Rehnquist’s draft 
memo argued that if Monroe’s blanket municipal non-liability rule was not 
retained, there was no logical way to avoid recognizing respondeat superior 
liability.152  Powell’s clerk prepared a memorandum to help the Justice 
respond to that argument if it arose during the upcoming conference.153  
Powell underlined in red a passage that argued that the rejection of 
respondeat superior was justified because “Congress was concerned with 
imposing liability on ‘wrongdoers.’  Absent authorization or the kind of 
recklessness from which one may infer authorization, [a city] could not be 
held at fault for the tortious excess of its employees.”154
 
 147. Id. at 2.  This quote is, of course, essentially identical to the language in Samuel 
Estreicher’s pre-conference memo and to language in the final opinion. Compare id., with 
Estreicher, supra note 
  In the margin, 
138, at 1, and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 707 
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 148. Justice Rehnquist, Second Draft Memorandum, supra note 145. 
 149. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell 1–2 (Feb. 23, 1978), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (stating that he would happily limit 
Monroe to its facts, rather than overruling it, but that he thought the municipal immunity 
issue should be deferred); Memorandum from Justice Burger to Justice Rehnquist (Feb. 13, 
1978), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 1, at Box 257:  File 11 (announcing that he agreed 
with Rehnquist); Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference, supra note 36, at 8–9 
(announcing that he would reverse but suggesting that the opinion explicitly limit Monroe to 
its facts rather than overruling it and also requesting that the opinion recognize municipal 
qualified immunity); Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Conference (Feb. 23, 1978), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (stating that he was no longer sure how he 
would vote and suggesting further discussion on the merits, but disagreeing with the 
suggestion to recommend municipal qualified immunity); Memorandum from Justice White 
to Justice Brennan (Feb. 25, 1978), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 
(agreeing that school boards should be subject to suit, expressing preference to avoid 
overruling Monroe, and stating that he would prefer to defer the immunity issue). 
 150. Memorandum from Justice Burger to Conference (Feb. 27, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 434:  File 3. 
 151. Rough Draft Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference (Mar. 6, 1978) 
(marked received 4:30 PM Mar. 5, 1978), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 
6.  Rehnquist distributed a revised form of the memo to the other Justices just before the 
conference. Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference (Mar. 6, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 6. 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 153. Memorandum from Samuel Estreicher to Justice Powell (Mar. 5, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 6. 
 154. Id. at 3–4. 
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Justice Powell himself wrote, “1983 debates made clear Congress was 
concerned with ‘wrongdoers.’”155
During the first round of discussion at the March 6 conference itself, six 
Justices (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens) agreed 
that the case should be reversed; and, in the second round, Justice Stewart 
became the seventh.
 
156  There was some disagreement about subsidiary 
issues—Justices Stevens and Blackmun preferred to flatly overrule Monroe 
rather than limit it to its facts,157 and Justices Powell and Stewart wanted to 
grant cities qualified immunity immediately rather than defer the issue to be 
decided in a future case158
On April 4, Brennan circulated a first draft opinion rejecting Monroe’s 
blanket municipal non-liabilty rule.
—but it appeared that Brennan had put together a 
solid majority behind a decision that would permit suits against 
municipalities while restricting that liability to situations in which the city 
could be described as at fault, i.e., as the actual wrongdoer. 
159  The portion of the draft that 
described the limits on such liability was replete with references to fault or 
blame as the standard for municipal liabilty under the actual wrongdoer 
theory.160  Justice Powell objected to other aspects of the draft,161
 
 155. Id. at 3. 
 but his 
 156. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes [Second Conference], supra note 41; Justice 
Brennan, Conference Notes [Second Conference], supra note 41; Justice Powell, Conference 
Notes [Second Conference] (Mar. 6, 1978), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 
6. 
 157. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes [Second Conference], supra note 41 
(paraphrasing Stevens as saying, “Overrule Monroe squarely – [Not doing so] would not be 
faithful to allegations of its complaint”); Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to 
Conference (Mar. 6, 1978), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 1 (“My inclination is to overrule 
[Monroe], but perhaps I could be persuaded, as are others, not to overrule it but to ‘confine it 
to its facts,’ even though that device is so often a euphemism for overruling.”); Justice 
Brennan, Conference Notes [Second Conference], supra note 41 (paraphrasing Stevens as 
saying, “Must overrule Monroe squarely along with other cases”); Justice Powell, 
Conference Notes [Second Conference] (Mar. 6, 1978), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at 
Box 189:  File 6 (paraphrasing Stevens as saying, “Should overrule Monroe and all that 
followed it”). 
 158. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes [Second Conference], supra note 41 
(paraphrasing Stewart as saying, “Entitled to know whether they have a Wood v. Strickland 
defense” and paraphrasing Powell as saying, “Could not impose liability on a body that 
reasonably thought it was not violating law.  Will have to see what is written.”); Justice 
Brennan, Conference Notes [Second Conference], supra note 41 (paraphrasing Powell as 
saying that cities “should have immunity unless constitutional doctrine has been settled, as it 
was not here” and paraphrasing Stewart as saying, “[M]unicipality could be held as ‘person’ 
for its own deliberate actions with a Wood v. Strickland defense – Would decide it & not 
leave [it] undecided.”). 
 159. Justice Brennan, First Opinion Draft (Apr. 4, 1978), in Marshall Papers, supra note 
1, at Box 200:  File 12. 
 160. See, e.g., id. at 29 (touchstone of municipal liability is allegation that “official policy 
or official action is to blame for” the violation); id. at 29 n.55 (for municipal liability, official 
action “must be sufficient to support a conclusion that a local government itself is to blame 
or is at fault”); id. (arguing that the court had earlier recognized that “fault is a crucial factor 
in determining whether relief may run against a party”); id. at 32 (defining respondeat 
superior as meaning “liability imposed on employers without regard to their fault or blame—
for the torts of their employees”); id. at 34 (describing vicarious liability as liability “for the 
torts of an employee when the employer is not at fault for negligent hiring, improper 
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reaction to the actual wrongdoer arguments was entirely positive.  His notes 
on Justice Brennan’s first draft opinion indicated that he was pleased with 
that argument.  For example, he underlined a passage stating that municipal 
liability should exist only if the conduct is “sufficient to support a 
conclusion that a local government itself is to blame or is at fault.” 162  He 
handwrote “Yes” in the margin next to that passage, and also next to a 
statement that the Court had previously “recognized that fault is a crucial 
factor in determining whether relief may run against a party for its alleged 
participation in a constitutional tort.”163  With one possible minor 
exception, he gave no indication that he had any problem with the 
numerous other passages reflecting the actual wrongdoer approach.164
After receiving Justice Powell’s response (as well as responses from 
Justices Stevens
 
165 and White166
 
training, or inadequate control or direction of his employees”); id. at 34 n.61 (stating that, 
when an employer is at fault in various respects, “that fault is the basis for liability” and the 
liability is not vicarious). 
 and a draft dissent from Justice 
 161. For example, Powell objected to Brennan’s claim that § 1983 was an attempt by 
Congress to exercise its full power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and insisted that it 
be removed. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan 2–3 (Apr. 11, 1978), in 
Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 7. 
 162. Justice Brennan, First Opinion Draft [with handwritten notes by Justice Powell and 
Samuel Estreicher] 29 n.55 (Apr. 4, 1978 [Powell’s notes dated Apr. 7, 1978]), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 12 [hereinafter Justice Brennan First Draft with 
Justice Powell Notes]. 
 163. Id. (underlining by Justice Powell); see also id. at 32 (not objecting to definition of 
respondeat superior as a theory which imposes liability “on employers without regard to 
their fault or blame” and writing “Yes” next to a passage stating that “Congress did not 
intend municipalities to be held vicariously liable on such a theory”) (underlining by Justice 
Powell). 
 164. See supra note 160.  The possible exception involves the deletion of the words “at 
least” from a sentence in which Justice Brennan had written that local governmental bodies 
could be sued, “at least in those situations where as here the action of the municipality . . . 
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially 
adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Justice Brennan, First Opinion Draft, 
supra note 159, at 29.  Although not mentioned in Powell’s April 11 memorandum to 
Brennan, Powell may have been responsible for deletion of the phrase which he had marked 
for deletion on his copy of Brennan’s draft. Justice Brennan First Draft with Justice Powell 
Notes, supra note 162, at 29.  Perhaps it was one of the unidentified language problems that 
Powell said could “be worked out among the law clerks.” Memorandum from Justice Powell 
to Justice Brennan, supra note 161, at 1.  In any event, the reason for the deletion is not 
apparent other than to narrow the statement of the holding. Justice Brennan First Draft with 
Justice Powell Notes, supra note 162, at unnumbered page after 41 (Powell stating that, on 
page 29, the “[h]olding is too broadly expressed”). 
 165. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Apr. 10, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (noting that he would join the opinion but not the 
full power argument or the portions rejecting respondeat superior). 
 166. Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan (Apr. 12, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 6 (describing his understanding of Brennan’s standard 
for municipal liability).  White’s role in the internal discussion of Monell is fascinating.  He 
was uncertain whether there was any basis for rejecting respondeat superior, id. at 2–3, and 
he recognized that “[t]he line between official policy for which the cities may be sued and 
vicarious responsibility for the sins of others is not immediately obvious,” id. at 1.  At the 
same time, he seems to have consistently advocated a very restricted scope for municipal 
liability and taken positions entirely consistent with the Frankfurter’s Champion theory. See, 
e.g., id. at 1–3 (describing various situations in which a city would not be liable); 
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Rehnquist167), Brennan circulated a second draft opinion.168  Although 
substantially reorganized and modified in other respects, it continued to use 
the fault-based, actual wrongdoer principle to define the boundary of 
municipal liability and retained almost all of the earlier draft’s relevant 
language.169  In addition, it substantially clarified, revised, and strengthened 
the principal legislative history argument for the fault-based standard.170  
Finally, it pithily summarized the actual wrongdoer theory in a single 
sentence:  “In sum, a local government may be sued for monetary, 
declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983 when it is at fault, but not for 
the fault purely of its employees or agents.”171  Powell appropriately 
labeled that sentence the “Bottom Line.”172
But that sentence, together with a related footnote, provoked a vehement 
memo from Justice Stewart
 
173
[F]ootnote 57 on page 32 [indicating that the rejection of vicarious 
liability was not inconsistent with suits based on “fault in hiring, training, 
or direction”
: 
174]  seems to me to be a veritable time bomb, particularly 
when it is read in light of the [“bottom line” sentence] on page 33.  
Although we have never decided that there can ever be a § 1983 action 
based on negligence alone, it seems to me that this footnote and sentence 
of text amount to a virtual invitation to not so ingenious lawyers to sue 
municipalities upon the ground that the municipalities were at fault with 
respect to hiring, training, or directing their erring policemen or other 
agents.175
 
Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan (Apr. 29, 1978), in Brennan Papers, 
supra note 
 
1, at Box 437:  File 7 (stating in handwritten notes that “a city would not be liable 
for ‘deliberate indifference’ or ‘negligence,’ even if its officials were, unless it was the 
official policy of the city to be indifferent or negligent.  That would seem a difficult matter to 
establish.”); Justice Brennan, Conference Notes, supra note 29, at 1 (municipal liability 
“[w]here agents do precisely what they’re authorized to do”).  It will be interesting what 
light, if any, is cast by his papers when they become available in 2012. 
 167. Justice Rehnquist, First Draft Dissent (Apr. 14, 1978), in Brennan Papers, supra note 
1, at Box 437:  File 6. 
 168. See supra note 130. 
 169. The second draft does eliminate some of the previous references but does so for 
reasons other than opposition to a fault-based standard.  For example, in the first draft’s 
discussion of how Monroe could be distinguished, Brennan stated and adopted Monroe’s 
definition of respondeat superior as employer liability without employer fault. Justice 
Brennan, First Opinion Draft, supra note 159, at 32.  That passage was necessarily 
eliminated in the second draft because the Court—to avoid having to deal with Justice 
Stevens’s argument that the Monroe complaint was not based solely on respondeat 
superior—eliminated the entire effort to distinguish Monroe, replacing it with a short 
statement that there was no reason to decide whether Monroe was right on its facts. Justice 
Brennan, Second Opinion Draft, supra note 130, at 40 n.68. 
 170. Compare Justice Brennan, First Opinion Draft, supra note 159, at 33 n.60, with 
Justice Brennan, Second Opinion Draft, supra note 130, at 31 n.56.  For an explanation of 
the argument, see supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
 171. Justice Brennan, Second Opinion Draft, supra note 130, at 33. 
 172. Justice Brennan First Draft with Justice Powell Notes, supra note 162, at 33. 
 173. Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Brennan (Apr. 24, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7. 
 174. Justice Brennan, Second Opinion Draft, supra note 130 at 32 n.57. 
 175. Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Brennan, supra note 173. 
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Justice Brennan responded the next day.  He was surprised at Stewart’s 
reaction to note 57 since “it stated a well-settled principle of common law” 
and was included to insure that “people understood the limited nature of the 
terms ‘vicarious liability’ and ‘respondeat superior.’”176  He indicated that 
in the interests of clarity, he preferred to keep the footnote, but would be 
willing to add a sentence explicitly leaving open the question of “[w]hether 
fault or negligence in hiring, training, or direction” was sufficient to state a 
§ 1983 cause of action.177
If Brennan expected this to mollify Stewart, he was mistaken.  The 
following day, Stewart responded sharply, writing, “[O]ur differences are 
deeper than I had been willing to acknowledge, even to myself.”
 
178  Stewart 
made it clear that any opinion that recognized the fault-based, actual 
wrongdoer principle as the basis for municipal liability was 
unacceptable.179
 I would hold that a municipal corporation is within [§ 1983’s] ambit in 
an action at law or suit in equity, when, through the affirmative, 
deliberate, knowing official action of its governing body, it is alleged to 
have deprived any person of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution or federal law. . . . 
  For Stewart, the standard had to be based on authorization 
rather than fault: 
 I would not imply, even by way of discussion that leaves the matter 
open, that a municipal corporation could ever be liable under § 1983 for 
indifference, inaction, or through the actions of its agents when not 
carrying out affirmatively authorized municipal policy.  I would not get 
into a discussion of the law of respondeat superior or the law of torts.  I 
would certainly not make use of the word “fault” which in the law of 
many states and in admiralty law is no more than a loose synonym for 
negligence.180
Stewart’s memorandum threatened to unravel Brennan’s majority.  At the 
end of that memo, Stewart stated that he would not join Part II of Brennan’s 
opinion, the portion defining the limits of municipal liability.
 
181  Justice 
Stevens had already written that he would not join Part II,182 and the next 
day, Justice Blackmun announced that he agreed with Stewart and 
Stevens.183
 
 176. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Stewart 1 (Apr. 25, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 
  Given the fact that the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist 
1, at Box 437:  File 7. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Brennan 1 (Apr. 26, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7. 
 179. Id. at 1–2. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. at 2. 
 182. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Apr. 26, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7.  It is unclear whether Stewart understood that he 
and Stevens fundamentally disagreed on the appropriate scope of municipal § 1983 liability:  
Stewart wanted it defined more narrowly than Brennan while Stevens wanted it defined 
more broadly. 
 183. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan (Apr. 27, 1978), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7 (stating that Blackmun was “about where 
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would dissent in toto, the Justices must have recognized that Brennan risked 
losing his majority unless Stewart could be mollified.184
Justice Powell’s reaction to this risk would test the nature and depth of 
his commitment to the fault-based, actual wrongdoer theory of municipal 
§ 1983 liability.  Did he believe that adherence to the theory was demanded 
because it most faithfully represented the legislative intent?  (That was the 
position his clerk urged, reminding Powell that “The ‘fault’ principle 
emerges from a careful reading of the legislative history.”)
 
185
On the other hand, perhaps Powell considered the actual wrongdoer 
theory simply a convenient lawyerly argument, developed by an 
exceptionally bright clerk, which Powell had used as a plausible 
justification for Powell’s real goal—an opinion restricting municipal 
liability to conduct that fell roughly within his (and Frankfurter’s) narrow 
definition of color of law.  In that case, one would expect Powell to have 
endorsed Justice Stewart’s demand for a shift to an authorization standard, 
particularly since that standard even more closely conformed to that 
definition. 
  If so, one 
would expect Powell to have objected to Stewart’s position and to have 
tried to persuade Brennan and his wavering colleagues to rally behind the 
actual wrongdoer standard. 
 Powell’s actual response to Stewart’s memorandum adopted the latter 
course.  It effectively abandoned the actual wrongdoer approach in favor of 
a standard based on authorization rather than fault.  On May 1, Powell 
wrote to Justice Brennan endorsing virtually all of Stewart’s proposed 
modifications of Brennan’s second draft.186  He described the correct rule 
as one stating that “§ 1983 does not impose liability on government entities 
for the unauthorized misconduct of employees.”187  He suggested that 
municipal liability for conduct pursuant to municipal custom should be 
limited to situations in which “the custom is unmistakably sanctioned by the 
municipality.”188  He agreed with Stewart that passages that referred to 
“fault” or even left open the possibility of municipal liability for deliberate 
indifference were unnecessary and could be deleted.189
 
Potter [Stewart] and John [Stevens] [were] in their respective letters of April 26,” but that he 
was “interested in what [Justice Powell] comes up with”). 
  The extent of 
Powell’s retreat from the actual wrongdoer theory is also indicated by what 
Powell omitted from this memo:  a passage from an earlier draft 
 184. Brennan explicitly acknowledged that risk a week later. Memorandum from Justice 
Brennan to Justice Powell 2 (May 2, 1978), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  
File 7. 
 185. Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Brennan 3 (Apr. 26, 1978), in Powell 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 8 (handwritten notes by Samuel Estreicher dated Apr. 
27, 1978). 
 186. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan 2 (May 1, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7. 
 187. Id. at 1 (describing Part II of the opinion as “a helpful—and I think correct—
explanation of why § 1983 does not impose liability on government entities for the 
unauthorized misconduct of employees”). 
 188. Id. at 2. 
 189. Id. 
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recognizing that the rejection of respondeat superior was based on the 
“‘fault’ principle.”190
Brennan acceded to Powell’s and Stewart’s proposed changes.
 
191  
Brennan’s third draft replaced the second draft’s fault-based, “bottom line” 
sentence with the neutral:  “We conclude, therefore, that a local government 
may not be sued for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or 
agents.”192  Brennan carefully eliminated every mention of the word “fault” 
from the text of the opinion, keeping the word only in two historical 
footnotes.193  The third draft, at Powell’s and Stewart’s urging, eliminated 
fault as the underlying justification for municipal liability and replaced it 
with authorization.  Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun rejoined the fold;194 
and, with only one minor substantive change,195
Ironically, the sole remnant of the “actual wrongdoer” theory in the three 
published opinions is contained in Justice Powell’s concurrence.  That 
opinion used language which reflected Powell’s belief that municipal 
liability should be limited by Frankfurter’s narrow definition of color of 
law.
 the third draft became the 
final opinion. 
196
 
 190. Compare Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan 1 (Apr. 25, 1978), in 
Powell Papers, supra note 
  But in one passage, it described Brennan’s majority opinion as 
having interpreted the rejection of the Sherman Amendment “as a limitation 
1, at Box 189:  File 8 (draft marked “Not Sent”) (referring to “the 
‘fault’ principle you recognize in Monell, with respect to respondeat superior liability of 
municipalities”), with Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan, supra note 186 
(omitting the sentence containing the quoted language). 
 191. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell (May 2, 1978), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7. 
 192. Id. at 1; Justice Brennan, Third Opinion Draft 34 (May 4, 1978), in Brennan Papers, 
supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7. 
 193. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell, supra note 191, at 1; Justice 
Brennan, Third Opinion Draft, supra note 192, at 21 n.40 & 32 n.57.  Ironically, the second 
of these footnotes is the principal legislative history argument for the Monell doctrine and 
makes no sense except as an argument for a fault-based standard for municipal liability. See 
supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
 194. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan (May 17, 1978), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7; Memorandum from Justice Powell to 
Justice Brennan (May 5, 1978), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 7 (“As 
your 3rd draft substantially accommodates my concerns (for which I thank you), I am glad to 
join you.”); Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Brennan (May 15, 1978), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 1, at Box 437:  File 8. 
 195. At Powell’s last-minute request, Brennan deleted the italicized phrase from a 
sentence that originally read, “Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat 
superior, where state law did not impose such an obligation, would have raised all the 
constitutional problems associated with the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation 
Congress chose not to impose because it thought imposition of such an obligation 
unconstitutional.” Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan, supra note 194 
(typed note appended to Justice Brennan’s copy but not to the other Justices’ copies of the 
memo) (subsequently deleted language in italics).  Powell requested that the phrase be 
deleted to avoid the implication that § 1983 respondeat superior liability might exist if state 
law recognized municipal respondeat superior. Id. 
 196. Monell v Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 707 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(Court is correct to deny immunity for “constitutional deprivation, even though such actions 
may be fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under, state law.  No conduct of 
government comes more clearly within the ‘under color of’ state law language of § 1983.”). 
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of the statutory ambit to actual wrongdoers.”197
 
  By the time the final 
opinions were handed down, that passage described a majority opinion that 
no longer existed—a draft opinion that had relied on the actual wrongdoer 
theory but had been replaced by a final opinion that did not.  And that final 
opinion effectively limited municipal § 1983 liability to those cases in 
which Frankfurter would have agreed that the constitutional violation was 
committed under color of law.  As to municipalities, Frankfurter’s views—
and those of his champion—had prevailed. 
 
 
 197. Id.  Powell’s clerk drafted the concurring opinion on or before May 1, i.e., the day 
before Justice Brennan’s capitulation to Stewart’s and Powell’s objections to the fault-based 
theory and at least three days before Brennan circulated the draft majority opinion that 
reflected that capitulation. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Samuel Estreicher 1 (May 8, 
1978), in Powell Papers, supra note 1, at Box 189:  File 9 (describing Estreicher’s May 1 
draft).  No copy of the May 1 draft of Powell’s concurrence has been found, but there is 
nothing to suggest that Powell’s “actual wrongdoer” language was added after Brennan’s 
memo abandoning the “actual wrongdoer” argument.  The final concurrence’s language was 
essentially identical to language used in Estreicher’s earlier memoranda as well as Powell’s 
initial memorandum adopting the actual wrongdoer approach. See supra note 147 and 
accompanying text.  Thus it seems likely that Powell’s final concurring opinion’s attribution 
of that argument to the majority was simply an oversight resulting from the last minute rush 
to announce the opinion. 
